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What’s Wrong with Risk? 
I. Introduction 
It is widely assumed that Nathan acts wrongly in the following case:  
Drunk Driver: Nathan gets drunk before driving recklessly. Although 
he has no reason to know it, Chloe is the only pedestrian who is on 
his route. Nathan significantly increases the risk that Chloe will be 
injured or killed. In the event, Chloe returns home unscathed and no 
one is aware that Nathan subjected Chloe to the risk.  
One might dismiss the judgment that the mere imposition of risk makes the 
conduct wrong, without the risk resulting in harm. But the intuitive view is that 
riskers commit wrongs when they cast the dice, not just when they turn up snake 
eyes.     
The judgement that Nathan acts wrongly persists even if Chloe or others are 
unaware of the risk being imposed on her. Were Chloe aware of the risk, she may 
become fearful or be compelled to take a longer route home. Were others aware 
of the risk, they too might become fearful or bear costs to protect her. If Chloe’s 
insurers knew of the risk, they might increase her premiums, making her 
financially worse off. We can concede that causing these effects can render 
Nathan’s conduct wrongful. The more difficult issue is why Nathan’s act is 
wrongful independently of these effects. We refer to this as the question of pure 
risking.1  
Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, we might think that 
Nathan acts wrongly because he engages in a general activity that carries a high 
degree of risk. On this view, he does not wrong anyone in particular. Perhaps his 
act is impersonally wrong because he violates a principle that forbids unjustified 
risk-taking. We need not deny that Nathan’s conduct may be wrong in this sense. 
But, as our emphasis on Nathan’s interaction with Chloe suggests, we are 
interested in the wrong that Nathan does to Chloe. Drunk Driver is not identical to 
a case in which a person drives recklessly in a completely unpopulated area 
(unbeknownst to him), as it involves a directed wrong to Chloe. Following others 
who have addressed the issue, we seek to understand why pure risking can be a 
directed wrong.       
                                                          
1 Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Imposing Risks’, in Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), 173; and John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), ch. 3. We use the term ‘act’ in a broad sense to include both acts and 
omissions. We also note that questions of pure risking can arise in cases involving intentional and 
unintentional acts.  
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Second, we note that pure risking is not always wrong, for example if the risk 
imposed is small and the benefit of imposing it is great. The views we discuss do 
not imply otherwise. Rather, they seek to explain only what makes pure risking 
wrong, when it is wrong, as in Drunk Driver. We do not provide any theory 
delimiting the scope of wrongful risking, although many are available, and our 
explanation of the wrongness of pure risking is consistent with these theories.2 
II. Conceptions of Risk 
One complication with our intuitive response to cases of pure risk is that we 
believe they can involve wrongdoing even though we lack a clear definition of 
risk. To make progress with this, it helps to draw two distinctions.  First, we can 
distinguish between belief-relative, evidence-relative, and fact-relative 
conceptions of risk.3  Belief-relative conceptions are a measure of the strength of 
some belief. Nathan imposes a belief-relative risk on Chloe if he believes that he 
might harm Chloe whilst drunk. Evidence-relative conceptions are a measure of 
the weight of the evidence about which an agent ought to be aware. He imposes 
an evidence-relative risk if he has good evidence that he might harm her and he 
ought to be aware of this evidence. Both conceptions of risk are subjective in the 
sense that Nathan’s belief, or the belief that he should form on the basis of the 
available evidence, may be mistaken. By contrast, fact-relative conceptions 
consider risk to be a fact about the world that is independent of beliefs and of an 
agent’s appraisal of the evidence. Nathan imposes a fact-relative risk on Chloe if, 
as a matter of fact, there is a chance that he will harm Chloe if he drives whilst 
drunk. The existence of this risk is determined by facts that are independent of 
Nathan’s beliefs and the available evidence. 
It bears emphasising that the evidence-relative conception of risk encapsulates a 
normative standard. It refers to judgements an agent should make about risk were 
she aware of the evidence of which she should be aware. We leave unspecified the 
precise scope of an individual’s duty to familiarise herself with relevant evidence. 
There are many hard cases, some involving specialists who have a duty to have 
more in-depth knowledge and some involving ordinary people, that will fall on 
the boundary. Since we are interested in the question of pure risking, we will 
leave this issue to one side and focus on cases, like Drunk Driving, where an 
individual should be aware of the relevant evidence on any plausible view of this 
duty.     
Let’s now turn to the second distinction, which is between those fact-relative 
conceptions of risk that are consistent with determinism and those that are not. 
                                                          
2 Johann Frick, ‘Contractualism and Social Risk’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 43 (2015), 175-223; 
and Rahul Kumar, ‘Risking and Wronging’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 43 (2015), 27-51.   
3 Derek Parfit, On What Matters Volume One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 150-151.  
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As an example, we can consider relative frequency theory, which defines risk in 
terms of the proportion of the events in a reference class that has the relevant 
property. The relative frequency of a coin landing on heads is approximately 50% 
since, given a stipulated reference class such as ‘normal coin flips’, about half of 
such flips will land on heads. This account is fact-relative in the sense that facts 
about relative frequencies are true or false independently of individuals’ beliefs or 
the available evidence. Facts about risk could be true even if there is no evidence 
to support them. Nevertheless, this account is consistent with determinism since, 
if the underlying causal processes are deterministic, then it is theoretically 
possible to predict, of each individual coin flip, whether it will land heads or 
tails.4 By contrast, some conceptions of fact-relative risk rely on indeterministic 
causal processes. This is the case with those conceptions that refer to risk from 
the perspective of a perfect predictor with all relevant information.5 Owing to the 
stochastic processes involved, it may be impossible to know, even in principle, 
when a given radioactive atom will decay.6 Conceptions of fact-relative risk that 
refer exclusively to risks of this kind are inconsistent with determinism since, if 
determinism were true, the perfect predictor would be able to predict when a 
given atom will decay if she had access to all relevant information.7 
We draw attention to these complications not only because they help us better 
understand the subject of our inquiry, but also because we later draw upon these 
distinctions to evaluate competing accounts of the wrongness of pure risking. 
Next, we introduce two accounts – The Harm Account and The Autonomy Account – 
which share two common weaknesses. Our criticisms provide the basis for a 
defence of an alternative view, which we call The Buck-Passing Account.  
 III. Two Accounts  
The Harm Account holds that pure risking is wrong, when it is, because risks are 
harms. Thus, Nathan wrongs Chloe because he harms her, even though the risk 
does not materialise into injury and no one other than Nathan is aware of the 
risk. One way to support this conclusion is to appeal to a symmetry between 
harms and benefits. Some believe that it is beneficial to receive a lottery ticket – 
                                                          
4 Stephen Perry, ‘Risk, Harm, and Responsibility’ in David G. Owen (ed.), Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 14. 
5 What makes this predictor perfect is that she is able accurately to predict everything that can be 
predicted given determinism. She is not able to predict the outcome of indeterministic causal 
processes.  
6 Oberdiek, Imposing Risk, 18.   
7 This conception of risk is a version of a relative frequency theory, one where the reference class 
is defined as precisely as possible (e.g. coins flipped with given force at a given angle etc.). If 
determinism is true, then we can define the reference class in such a way that the perfect predictor 
will know that the relative frequency of these coin flips landing on heads is either 0 or 1. With this 
conception, risk therefore arises only if determinism is false, since it is only then that the perfect 
predictor will not be able accurately to predict the outcome.  
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even a losing one – as it yields a chance of financial reward, so just as an agent’s 
increased chance of receiving a benefit is itself a benefit, an agent’s increased 
chance of suffering a harm is itself a harm.8            
To make sense of this view, we must specify a metric of harm and show its 
appropriateness for risk-based harms. The metric of harm is the good or goods 
setback to which constitutes harm. A variety of metrics are available to defenders 
of The Harm Account. One view about the metric of harm is that an individual is 
harmed if her preferences are frustrated. In Drunk Driver, Chloe is harmed on this 
view if her preference not to be subject to risk is frustrated by Nathan.9 
Alternatively, Chloe may be harmed by a setback to objectively valuable goods 
regardless of her attitude towards them. For example, if dignity is objectively 
valuable, Nathan’s drunk driving may harm Chloe by interfering with her dignity 
interests.10  
John Oberdiek has recently developed an alternative to The Harm Account. The 
Autonomy Account holds that pure risking is wrong because ‘it effectively attaches 
sanctions to or normatively forecloses certain options that would otherwise be 
available to the individual, thereby narrowing the risked person’s set of 
worthwhile opportunities’.11 In Drunk Driver, Nathan effectively forecloses some 
of Chloe’s options, since there are now some paths that Chloe cannot take 
without physical injury. Oberdiek clarifies his view by comparing pure risks and 
laying traps:  
Laying a trap in itself materially affects no one, but it can nevertheless 
impinge upon a person’s non-material autonomy interest. This is 
because the trap takes away the option, or more accurately renders 
unacceptable the exercise of the option, of stepping where the trap has 
been set.12 
The Harm Account and The Autonomy Account each has its advantages. Although 
the metaphysics of harm is hotly contested,13 at least some metrics of harm (such 
as preferences) allow that risks can be harmful. Like The Harm Account, The 
Autonomy Account appeals to a factor of central moral interest. As the trap analogy 
                                                          
8 Claire Finkelstein, ‘Is Risk A Harm?’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (2003), 963–
1001, 967. 
9 Finkelstein, ‘Is Risk A Harm?’. 
10 Adriana Placani, ‘When the Risk of Harm Harms’, Law and Philosophy, 36 (2017), 77–100.    
11 Oberdiek, Imposing Risk, 85.   
12 Oberdiek, Imposing Risk, 86.   
13 Seana Shiffrin, ‘Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm’, Legal 
Theory, 5 (1999), 117-148; Stephen Perry, ‘Harm, History and Counterfactuals’, San Diego Law 
Review, 40 (2003), 1283-1313; David Velleman, ‘Persons in Prospect’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 




reveals, it is prima facie plausible that removing options limits autonomy, even if 
those options would never have been taken.14        
IV. The Separation Objection 
The Separation Objection holds that it is a mistake to separate whatever makes an 
act wrong from whatever makes risking that act wrong. The intuitive plausibility 
of this objection does not depend on any particular account of the facts that 
ground moral wrongness. It holds regardless of whether the wrongness of the 
risked act is based on harm, autonomy, impersonal value, or any other wrong-
making property. This suggests that there is a close relationship between the 
factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong. 
The Harm Account and The Autonomy Account fail to recognise this relationship and 
implausibly separate the grounds of the wrongness of risking v from the grounds 
of the wrongness of v-ing. 
As a result, both accounts have implausible implications in cases where the 
wrongness of the risked act is not explained by harm or autonomy-interference. 
Whilst harm and interference with autonomy explain the wrongness of many 
actions, they do not provide an exhaustive list of factors that affect permissibility. 
Though controversial, there are compelling reasons to think that the intentions 
with which an agent acts can affect permissibility. To illustrate this criticism, let’s 
consider the following two cases:15  
Duress: Andre is threatened that unless he robs a post office his family 
will be killed. Andre robs the post office. 
Overdetermination: Irina and Emma both wish to poison Rosaria. Two 
doses together will kill Rosaria quickly whilst one dose will give her a 
painful death. Irina doses Rosaria. Knowing that Irina has done so, 
Emma doses Rosaria and in doing so prevents her from having a 
painful death.  
In Duress, the fact that Andre has access to a reason that would justify robbing the 
post office does not make this act permissible if he commits the robbery because 
he enjoys the thrill of crime.16 In Overdetermination, if Emma’s intention is to kill 
                                                          
14 We acknowledge that the meaning and value of autonomy is highly controversial. For 
discussion, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chs 14 and 
15.   
15 See Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), ch. 7; and Adam Slavny and Tom Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’, Legal 
Theory, 21 (2016), 100 – 114. 
16 Some believe that duress can be an excuse for wrongdoing but never a justification. We reject 
this for reasons given by Victor Tadros in ‘Duress and Duty’ in Saba Bazargan and Samuel 
Rickless (eds.), The Ethics of War: Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), ch. 5.  
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Rosaria because she is her enemy, she does not act permissibly. Conversely, 
Emma acts permissibly if she doses Rosaria to avert a painful death. We might 
say that, if Andre and Emma act with the wrong intentions, their acts are 
justifiable but not justified. These examples do not settle the issue, though we hope 
they indicate that denying the relevance of intentions to permissibility is 
counterintuitive. In any case, this is one example of a wrong-making property 
distinct from harm and autonomy-interference, and there are others, such as 
setback to impersonal value.17   
If correct, there must be cases in which P wrongfully imposes a risk of v-ing and 
v’s wrongness is not explained by either harm or autonomy-interference. Let’s 
consider a variation of Overdetermination in which, for no good reason, Emma 
flips a coin to determine whether she will poison Rosaria: if tails, she will leave 
Rosaria alone; if heads, she will form and act on the intention to kill Rosaria. It is 
difficult to see why, if the wrongness of poisoning Rosaria is explained by 
Emma’s intentions in Overdetermination, we should appeal to a different factor to 
explain the wrongness of imposing a risk of poisoning Rosaria. We cannot 
explain the wrongness of flipping the coin by appealing to Rosaria’s intention. 
She forms and acts on this intention only if the coin lands on heads, but 
intuitively she imposes a wrongful risk before that point, when she flips the coin. 
The Harm Account and The Autonomy Account are too narrow and thus fail to 
explain the wrongness of Emma’s actions in this variation.  
It might be objected that Emma’s act is not wrong because she imposes a risk, but 
because she takes it upon herself to determine whether Rosario lives or dies. This 
is an intuitive explanation of the wrongness of Emma’s act, but it does not 
undermine our main point. It is unclear whether the objection identifies a distinct 
wrong-making factor. On one reading, taking another’s fate into one’s own hands 
refers to either intentional killing or imposing a risk of intentional killing. On 
another reading, taking another’s fate into one’s own hands excludes intentional 
killing and refers only to taking a chance with someone else’s life. But, if this is 
the case, then all we have is a redescription of the phenomenon of risking, and 
the fact that Emma takes it upon herself to determine whether Rosario lives or 
dies cannot function as an independent factor that explains the wrongness of the 
risk. Finally, perhaps what explains the wrong is the badness of Emma’s 
intentions when she imposes this risk. If so, this is not necessary for the risk to be 
wrong. If we imagine that Emma acts out of indecision (rather than a desire to 
control the fate of another), the intuition that her act is wrongful persists. This 
brings us back to the central point, namely that there is a plurality of wrong-
making factors that we must incorporate into an account of the wrongness of 
pure risks, since there is a plurality of wrong-making factors that affect that 
                                                          
17 Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 15.  
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wrongness of actions generally. These difficulties for The Harm Account and The 
Autonomy Account reflect the close relationship between the grounds of the 
wrongness of risking v and the grounds of the wrongness of v-ing, a relationship 
that both accounts ignore.  
To illustrate the objection more formally: let some set of facts {f} ground the 
wrongness of some non-risk-based act v. Let a person P take a significant risk of 
v-ing for no good reason. We have powerful reasons to conclude that P has acted 
wrongly, without knowing anything more about what is in {f}. For example, if its 
being contrary to god’s will makes v-ing wrong, it is wrong to risk v-ing, because 
doing so risks doing something contrary to god’s will. Any account of the 
wrongness of pure risking should be able to explain this general relationship 
between wrongness in non-risking cases and the wrong of risking. By focussing 
on substantive wrong-making properties, The Harm Account and The Autonomy 
Account fail to do this. 
V. The Determinism Objection 
The second objection is The Determinism Objection. It holds that The Harm Account 
and The Autonomy Account can explain the wrongness of only those risks that are 
inconsistent with determinism. To develop this objection, we return to Drunk 
Driver. It is intuitive that Nathan subjects Chloe to a risk, but if determinism is 
true, there is a sense in which this intuition is misleading. Nathan imposes an 
evidence-relative risk on Chloe since, from Nathan’s position, he has good 
evidence that his drink-driving may injure Chloe. Fact-relative, it is also true that 
Nathan increases the risk to Chloe in terms of relative frequency. Given a suitable 
reference class, such as instances of drink-driving, more of these instances result 
in injury to pedestrians compared to a similar class of driving events that do not 
involve driving whilst drunk. But this is consistent with the idea that any instance 
of drink-driving either will or will not result in injury, given determinism. With 
full information, we could in principle predict whether Nathan will or will not 
injure Chloe. If this is true, then Drunk Driver is relevantly similar to the following 
case: 
Drunk Driver 2: Same as Drunk Driver, except Chloe stays at home 
whilst Nathan drink-drives.  
If determinism is true, then in both cases, it is a fact that Chloe will not be 
injured, despite our intuitive sense that Chloe is in greater danger in Drunk Driver 
than in Drunk Driver 2. The salient difference is in terms of the evidence-relative 
risk that Nathan imposes on Chloe. In the original case, the evidence available to 
Nathan (misleadingly) supports the judgment that there is a chance that he will 
hit Chloe. In the revised case, the evidence available to Nathan (correctly) 
supports the reverse judgment, namely that there is no chance that he will hit 
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Chloe. The difference between these cases therefore consists in what judgment 
the evidence available to Nathan supports.  
This analysis helps to reveal a flaw in The Harm Account and The Autonomy 
Account. Both views explain the wrongness of pure risks by referring to the effects 
of a risk on the victim: The Harm Account emphasizes the harmfulness of these 
effects, and The Autonomy Account emphasizes how these effects impinge 
autonomy interests. But many pure risks do not affect their victims, and instead 
exist only in the mind of the risk-taker. Let’s consider another variation of Drunk 
Driver in which Chloe knows that she will not be injured. It is still wrong for 
Nathan to impose an evidence-relative risk of harming Chloe even though it is a 
fact (known to Chloe but unknown to Nathan) that she will not be injured. 
However, it is hard to see how Nathan having evidence that he might harm 
Chloe harms or interferes with her autonomy when Chloe knows otherwise. It is 
more plausible that Chloe is harmed or autonomy-impeded where she has 
evidence about the possibility of being harmed or having her autonomy interfered 
with compared to when Nathan has such evidence. But the wrongness of risking 
is surely located in Nathan’s evidence, not Chloe’s. Given this, we should not 
attempt to explain the wrongness of pure risks by referring to their effects, as per 
The Harm Account and The Autonomy Account. 
For these reasons, it is not plausible that belief- or evidence-relative risks count as 
harms, contra The Harm Account. The existence of evidence, especially when the 
victim is unaware of it, does not represent a chance of suffering a burden by itself. 
Thus, receiving a lottery ticket that will not win is relevantly similar to receiving a 
fraudulent lottery ticket. Neither ticket will win, given that determinism is true. If 
we accept that a fraudulent ticket is not a benefit, the same goes for the genuine 
ticket as well.  
The Autonomy Account is vulnerable to a similar line of reasoning. It will 
presumably be accepted by supporters of this account that a trap placed on Mars 
poses no threat to autonomy by removing a possible option. But this case is 
relevantly similar to a case in which a trap is placed within walking distance if it 
is determined that a person will not fall victim to it. So, as before, if we accept 
that the trap on Mars does not affect autonomy, we should conclude that a 
nearby trap does not do so either.18 
The Determinism Objection poses two significant problems for both accounts. First, 
these accounts can be motivated only if the cases we are trying to explain involve 
                                                          
18 A related problem for The Autonomy Account is that it can have difficulty explaining the greater 
wrongfulness of imposing higher risks. For example, it is worse to lay a fully reliable trap than it is 
to lay one that functions only 90% of the time. However, since both traps effectively foreclose the 
same option – namely, stepping where the trap is set – they would seem to impinge on autonomy 
to the same degree. We thank Doug Husak for discussion of this point.   
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genuinely indeterministic risks. We do not deny that such risks may exist, but it is 
a limitation of any view about the wrongness of risking to rely on this 
assumption. Second, even granting that indeterministic risks exist, they will not 
account for all – or even the majority – of cases of wrongful pure risking. In 
Drunk Driver, Nathan acts wrongly regardless of whether the risk is 
indeterministic. Nathan acts wrongly even if the risk he imposes on Chloe 
involves no indeterminacy because it is belief- or evidence-relative or fact-relative 
in terms of relative frequency.   
VI. The Buck-Passing Account 
Based on the previous analysis, there are two constraints on any explanation of 
why pure risks can be wrong. The first, following The Separation Objection, is that 
any view must account for the general relationship between the grounds of the 
wrongness of risking v and the grounds of the wrongness of v-ing. The second, 
following The Determinism Objection, is that any view must be able to explain the 
wrongness of risks in a deterministic world. Accordingly, our view should not be 
solely focussed on the effects of a risk on its victim.  
We defend an alternative:   
The Buck-Passing Account:19 When it is wrong for P to impose a risk of 
v-ing on Q, the fact that it is wrong for P to risk v-ing is grounded 
directly in the fact that P increases the probability of a set of facts {f} 
obtaining that would make it wrong for P to v. 
This account is basic in the sense that it does not explain the wrongness of pure 
risks by referring to independent normative considerations. Instead, it passes the 
explanatory buck by referring to the wrongness of the risked act. For example, in 
Drunk Driver, we explain Nathan’s wrong by direct appeal to the wrongness of 
harming Chloe.  
This basic explanation incorporates a wider range of wrong-making factors than 
harm. In cases where an act is wrong because of an agent’s intentions, we also 
explain the wrongness of risking these acts with reference to these intentions. In 
Overdetermination, if we appeal to Emma’s intentions to explain why it is wrong to 
poison Rosaria, then we should similarly appeal to Emma’s intentions to explain 
why it is wrong for her to flip a coin to decide whether to poison Rosaria. The 
Buck-Passing Account thus overcomes The Separation Objection.  
                                                          
19 We take this name from T. M. Scanlon’s discussion of goodness and value. See his What We 
Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 97. Although we adopt this 
terminology, we do not assume the truth of Scanlon’s view.  
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Moreover, since our view is not effect-focussed, it can explain the wrongness of 
risks in a deterministic world. We explain the difference between Drunk Driver 
and Drunk Driver 2 by appealing to the fact that the evidence-relative risk imposed 
by Nathan is much greater in the former case, since the evidence available 
suggests that he is more likely to cause injury. The Buck-Passing Account thus 
overcomes The Determinism Objection. 
In summary, when explaining the wrongness of risking, our task is to ‘determine 
whether there are any normative reasons that can make risky action as such 
impermissible’.20 While there are such reasons, it is a mistake to think that these 
are substantively different to those that make the risked act wrong. The Separation 
Objection hints at the truth of The Buck-Passing Account since, if it is valid, then the 
correct view of wrongful risking must incorporate exactly the factors that can 
make risked acts wrong.  
Throughout, we have assumed that our intuitive response to Drunk Driver is 
correct: that Nathan acts wrongfully by imposing a risk on Chloe. A final 
objection to the views outlined in this paper, including The Buck-Passing Account, 
denies this starting assumption. According to this objection, we can conclude 
only that riskers are potentially blameworthy, but not that they act 
impermissibly.21 In Drunk Driver, we might think that Nathan merely exhibits bad 
character. If we knew in advance that Nathan would not harm Chloe, we might 
be more receptive to the idea that, although Nathan is blameworthy because he 
has reason to believe he will act wrongly, he will not in fact act wrongly.    
This objection assumes that, to be impermissible, an act must have an effect on 
the victim, and it rejects the idea that intentions or other features of an agent’s 
deliberation can affect moral permissibility. As a general claim, this is 
questionable. We have already given examples suggesting that intentions can 
affect the permissibility of actions. There is plenty more to say on this debate, but 
we will not rehearse the arguments here since they are adequately dealt with 
elsewhere.22 
Furthermore, The Buck-Passing Account does not rely on any feature of an agent’s 
deliberation to hold that evidence-relative risking is wrong. For example, let’s 
suppose that some act is wrong only because it causes harm. Our account 
suggests that increasing the evidence-relative likelihood of committing this act 
may itself be wrong in virtue of the same fact. We derive the conclusion that the 
risk may be wrong from the fact that the risked act is wrong. As noted, we argue 
                                                          
20 Oberdiek, Imposing Risk, 74.  
21 For this objection, see Oberdiek, Imposing Risk, 89-90.  
22 See Tadros, The Ends of Harm, ch. 7; Slavny and Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’; and Tom 
Parr, ‘Revisiting Harmless Discrimination’, Philosophia (Online First).  
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that The Buck-Passing Account relies on a basic normative fact and therefore it is 
difficult to defend through independent argument. However, it is worth noting 
that the above objection does not bite against our view, since we do not appeal 
directly to the wrong-making status of intentions to explain the wrongness of pure 
risking, even though this is consistent with intentions having this status.23 
                                                          
23 For helpful comments on this paper and the ideas we discuss in it, we thank Clare Burgum, 
Matthew Clayton, Johann Frick, Doug Husak, Rahul Kumar, Hugh Lazenby, Kian Mintz-Woo, 
John Oberdiek, Victor Tadros, and Kartik Upadhyaya, as well as audiences at a workshop on 
John Oberdiek’s Imposing Risk at the University of Warwick and at a workshop on ‘Justice and 
Risk’ at Nuffield College, University of Oxford, organised by Jess Begon and Alice Baderin. 
